A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market

Autores
Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando
Año de publicación
2025
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choicefunctions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associatedone-to-one market. Given that the usual notion of stability for a one-to-one market doesnot fit well for this associated one-to-one market, we introduce a new notion of stability.This notion allows us to establish an isomorphism between the set of stable matchings inthe many-to-one market and the matchings in an associated one-to-one market that meetthis new stability criterion. Furthermore, we present an adaptation of the well-knowndeferred acceptance algorithm to compute a matching that satisfies this new notion ofstability for the associated one-to-one market. Finally, as a byproduct of our isomorphism,we prove an adapted version of the so-called Rural Hospital Theorem.
Fil: Neme, Pablo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Materia
MANY-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
AIZERMAN–MALISHEVSKI DECOMPOSITION
ONE-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE ALGORITHM
STABLE SET
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/289822
Acceder
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network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching marketNeme, Pablo AlejandroOviedo, Jorge ArmandoMANY-TO-ONE MATCHINGSAIZERMAN–MALISHEVSKI DECOMPOSITIONONE-TO-ONE MATCHINGSDEFERRED ACCEPTANCE ALGORITHMSTABLE SEThttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choicefunctions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associatedone-to-one market. Given that the usual notion of stability for a one-to-one market doesnot fit well for this associated one-to-one market, we introduce a new notion of stability.This notion allows us to establish an isomorphism between the set of stable matchings inthe many-to-one market and the matchings in an associated one-to-one market that meetthis new stability criterion. Furthermore, we present an adaptation of the well-knowndeferred acceptance algorithm to compute a matching that satisfies this new notion ofstability for the associated one-to-one market. Finally, as a byproduct of our isomorphism,we prove an adapted version of the so-called Rural Hospital Theorem.Fil: Neme, Pablo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaFil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; ArgentinaSpringer2025-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/289822Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market; Springer; Top; 11-2025; 1-201134-5764CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11750-025-00709-yinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11750-025-00709-yinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.00564info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-08-25T14:47:44Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/289822instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-08-25 14:47:44.424CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
title A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
spellingShingle A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
Neme, Pablo Alejandro
MANY-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
AIZERMAN–MALISHEVSKI DECOMPOSITION
ONE-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE ALGORITHM
STABLE SET
title_short A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
title_full A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
title_fullStr A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
title_full_unstemmed A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
title_sort A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Neme, Pablo Alejandro
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
author Neme, Pablo Alejandro
author_facet Neme, Pablo Alejandro
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
author_role author
author2 Oviedo, Jorge Armando
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv MANY-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
AIZERMAN–MALISHEVSKI DECOMPOSITION
ONE-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE ALGORITHM
STABLE SET
topic MANY-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
AIZERMAN–MALISHEVSKI DECOMPOSITION
ONE-TO-ONE MATCHINGS
DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE ALGORITHM
STABLE SET
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choicefunctions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associatedone-to-one market. Given that the usual notion of stability for a one-to-one market doesnot fit well for this associated one-to-one market, we introduce a new notion of stability.This notion allows us to establish an isomorphism between the set of stable matchings inthe many-to-one market and the matchings in an associated one-to-one market that meetthis new stability criterion. Furthermore, we present an adaptation of the well-knowndeferred acceptance algorithm to compute a matching that satisfies this new notion ofstability for the associated one-to-one market. Finally, as a byproduct of our isomorphism,we prove an adapted version of the so-called Rural Hospital Theorem.
Fil: Neme, Pablo Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
Fil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi"; Argentina
description For a many-to-one market where firms are endowed with path-independent choicefunctions, based on the Aizerman-Malishevski decomposition, we define an associatedone-to-one market. Given that the usual notion of stability for a one-to-one market doesnot fit well for this associated one-to-one market, we introduce a new notion of stability.This notion allows us to establish an isomorphism between the set of stable matchings inthe many-to-one market and the matchings in an associated one-to-one market that meetthis new stability criterion. Furthermore, we present an adaptation of the well-knowndeferred acceptance algorithm to compute a matching that satisfies this new notion ofstability for the associated one-to-one market. Finally, as a byproduct of our isomorphism,we prove an adapted version of the so-called Rural Hospital Theorem.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/289822
Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market; Springer; Top; 11-2025; 1-20
1134-5764
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/289822
identifier_str_mv Neme, Pablo Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; A decomposition from a many-to-one matching market with path-independent choice functions to a one-to-one matching market; Springer; Top; 11-2025; 1-20
1134-5764
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11750-025-00709-y
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11750-025-00709-y
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/arxiv/https://arxiv.org/pdf/2411.00564
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.24418

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