Market distortions and government transparency

Autores
Albornoz, Facundo; Esteban, Joan; Vanin, Paolo
Año de publicación
2014
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.
Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. Universidad de Birmingham; Reino Unido. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Fil: Esteban, Joan. Instituto de Analisis Economico; España
Fil: Vanin, Paolo. Universita Di Bologna; Italia
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
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oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/8673
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spelling Market distortions and government transparencyAlbornoz, FacundoEsteban, JoanVanin, Paolohttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. Universidad de Birmingham; Reino Unido. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaFil: Esteban, Joan. Instituto de Analisis Economico; EspañaFil: Vanin, Paolo. Universita Di Bologna; ItaliaWiley2014-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/8673Albornoz, Facundo; Esteban, Joan; Vanin, Paolo; Market distortions and government transparency; Wiley; Journal of the European Economic Association; 12; 1; 2-2014; 200-2221542-4774enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12052/abstractinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/jeea.12052info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-08-25T15:08:24Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/8673instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-08-25 15:08:24.83CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Market distortions and government transparency
title Market distortions and government transparency
spellingShingle Market distortions and government transparency
Albornoz, Facundo
title_short Market distortions and government transparency
title_full Market distortions and government transparency
title_fullStr Market distortions and government transparency
title_full_unstemmed Market distortions and government transparency
title_sort Market distortions and government transparency
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Albornoz, Facundo
Esteban, Joan
Vanin, Paolo
author Albornoz, Facundo
author_facet Albornoz, Facundo
Esteban, Joan
Vanin, Paolo
author_role author
author2 Esteban, Joan
Vanin, Paolo
author2_role author
author
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.
Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. Universidad de Birmingham; Reino Unido. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Fil: Esteban, Joan. Instituto de Analisis Economico; España
Fil: Vanin, Paolo. Universita Di Bologna; Italia
description In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-02
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/8673
Albornoz, Facundo; Esteban, Joan; Vanin, Paolo; Market distortions and government transparency; Wiley; Journal of the European Economic Association; 12; 1; 2-2014; 200-222
1542-4774
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/8673
identifier_str_mv Albornoz, Facundo; Esteban, Joan; Vanin, Paolo; Market distortions and government transparency; Wiley; Journal of the European Economic Association; 12; 1; 2-2014; 200-222
1542-4774
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jeea.12052/abstract
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/jeea.12052
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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