Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs

Autores
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
Año de publicación
2026
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Higher-order likes and desires sometimes lead agents to have ungrounded or paradoxical preferences. This situation is particularly problematic in the context of games. If payoffs are interdependent, the overall assessment of particular courses of action becomes ungrounded; in such cases, the game’s matrix is radically underdetermined. Paradigmatic examples of this phenomenon occur when players are ‘perfect lovers’ or ‘perfect haters’, in a sense to be explained. In this paper, I use a dynamic doxastic logic to mimic the search for a suitable matrix. Upgrades are triggered by conjectures about other players’ utilities, which can, in turn, be based on behavioural or verbal cues. We can prove that, under certain conditions, pairs of agents with paradoxical preferences eventually come to believe theycannot interact in a game. As a result, I hope to provide a better understanding of game-theoretic ungroundedness and, more generally, of the structure of higher-order preferences and desires.
Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
preference logic
game theory
belief change
paradoxicality
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
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Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded PayoffsCresto, Eleonora Beatrizpreference logicgame theorybelief changeparadoxicalityhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Higher-order likes and desires sometimes lead agents to have ungrounded or paradoxical preferences. This situation is particularly problematic in the context of games. If payoffs are interdependent, the overall assessment of particular courses of action becomes ungrounded; in such cases, the game’s matrix is radically underdetermined. Paradigmatic examples of this phenomenon occur when players are ‘perfect lovers’ or ‘perfect haters’, in a sense to be explained. In this paper, I use a dynamic doxastic logic to mimic the search for a suitable matrix. Upgrades are triggered by conjectures about other players’ utilities, which can, in turn, be based on behavioural or verbal cues. We can prove that, under certain conditions, pairs of agents with paradoxical preferences eventually come to believe theycannot interact in a game. As a result, I hope to provide a better understanding of game-theoretic ungroundedness and, more generally, of the structure of higher-order preferences and desires.Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaNicolaus Copernicus University2026-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/290012Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs; Nicolaus Copernicus University; Logic And Logical Philosophy; 3-2026; 1-291425-3305CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.12775/LLP.2026.005info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-08-25T15:07:45Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/290012instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-08-25 15:07:45.578CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
title Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
spellingShingle Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
preference logic
game theory
belief change
paradoxicality
title_short Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
title_full Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
title_fullStr Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
title_sort Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
author Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
author_facet Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv preference logic
game theory
belief change
paradoxicality
topic preference logic
game theory
belief change
paradoxicality
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Higher-order likes and desires sometimes lead agents to have ungrounded or paradoxical preferences. This situation is particularly problematic in the context of games. If payoffs are interdependent, the overall assessment of particular courses of action becomes ungrounded; in such cases, the game’s matrix is radically underdetermined. Paradigmatic examples of this phenomenon occur when players are ‘perfect lovers’ or ‘perfect haters’, in a sense to be explained. In this paper, I use a dynamic doxastic logic to mimic the search for a suitable matrix. Upgrades are triggered by conjectures about other players’ utilities, which can, in turn, be based on behavioural or verbal cues. We can prove that, under certain conditions, pairs of agents with paradoxical preferences eventually come to believe theycannot interact in a game. As a result, I hope to provide a better understanding of game-theoretic ungroundedness and, more generally, of the structure of higher-order preferences and desires.
Fil: Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Humanidades; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description Higher-order likes and desires sometimes lead agents to have ungrounded or paradoxical preferences. This situation is particularly problematic in the context of games. If payoffs are interdependent, the overall assessment of particular courses of action becomes ungrounded; in such cases, the game’s matrix is radically underdetermined. Paradigmatic examples of this phenomenon occur when players are ‘perfect lovers’ or ‘perfect haters’, in a sense to be explained. In this paper, I use a dynamic doxastic logic to mimic the search for a suitable matrix. Upgrades are triggered by conjectures about other players’ utilities, which can, in turn, be based on behavioural or verbal cues. We can prove that, under certain conditions, pairs of agents with paradoxical preferences eventually come to believe theycannot interact in a game. As a result, I hope to provide a better understanding of game-theoretic ungroundedness and, more generally, of the structure of higher-order preferences and desires.
publishDate 2026
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2026-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/290012
Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs; Nicolaus Copernicus University; Logic And Logical Philosophy; 3-2026; 1-29
1425-3305
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/290012
identifier_str_mv Cresto, Eleonora Beatriz; Dynamic Logic for Ungrounded Payoffs; Nicolaus Copernicus University; Logic And Logical Philosophy; 3-2026; 1-29
1425-3305
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.12775/LLP.2026.005
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nicolaus Copernicus University
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nicolaus Copernicus University
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1874775185986420736
score 13.265058

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