Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy

Autores
Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul
Año de publicación
2025
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Why should we value democratic institutions? How does the number of individuals whose preferences are satisfied contribute to the quality of decisions made through this procedure? Should political decisions be entrusted to experts instead of allowing majorities to have decisive influence? Suppose we set aside the egalitarian values inherently present in democratic institutions and their supposed epistemic potential. We argue that increasing the satisfaction of the free and informed preferences of those affected—whether by generating the greatest possible consensus around binding decisions or by creating spaces of partial deregulation—contributes crucially to decision quality. This is because relevant political decisions are invariably made in contexts of risk. Risk acts as the non-epistemic bridge between the number of individuals supporting a decision and the quality of the expected outcome.In contexts marked by a significant probability of error and a high cost of error to individual well-being, decision-making should be conducted through an open and perpetually revisable system. This system must combine majority rule with the effective possibility of contestation at the individual or collective level, seeking to incrementally accommodate individual preferences. Rather than justifying governmental decisions solely on the grounds that they are “correct” or that decision procedures track the truth, the system’s objective should be to remain sensitive to the range of acceptable gains and tolerable losses for each affected individual. The fundamental problem is not agent fallibility itself—the making of factual or normative errors—but rather the exposure of affected individuals to risk levels incompatible with the sustainability of their life projects.We offer an instrumental, non-epistemic justification of a republican conception of democracy. To this end, we develop a novel consequentialist normative theory, which we term risk-centered ordinal consequentialism. This conception aims to account for defining aspects of political normativity. In this framework, the criterion of correctness—without relinquishing the pursuit of objective and impartial reasons—is the degree to which decisions approach the twin ideals of fully free and informed consensus and deregulation without interpersonal domination. In a republican democracy, the maximization of expected good—or utility—and of freedom as non-domination are extensionally equivalent.
Fil: Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso". - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso".; Argentina
Materia
Risk
Contestatory Democracy
Epistocracy
Consequentialism
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/291677
Acceder
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spelling Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of DemocracyGarreta Leclercq, Mariano RaulRiskContestatory DemocracyEpistocracyConsequentialismhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Why should we value democratic institutions? How does the number of individuals whose preferences are satisfied contribute to the quality of decisions made through this procedure? Should political decisions be entrusted to experts instead of allowing majorities to have decisive influence? Suppose we set aside the egalitarian values inherently present in democratic institutions and their supposed epistemic potential. We argue that increasing the satisfaction of the free and informed preferences of those affected—whether by generating the greatest possible consensus around binding decisions or by creating spaces of partial deregulation—contributes crucially to decision quality. This is because relevant political decisions are invariably made in contexts of risk. Risk acts as the non-epistemic bridge between the number of individuals supporting a decision and the quality of the expected outcome.In contexts marked by a significant probability of error and a high cost of error to individual well-being, decision-making should be conducted through an open and perpetually revisable system. This system must combine majority rule with the effective possibility of contestation at the individual or collective level, seeking to incrementally accommodate individual preferences. Rather than justifying governmental decisions solely on the grounds that they are “correct” or that decision procedures track the truth, the system’s objective should be to remain sensitive to the range of acceptable gains and tolerable losses for each affected individual. The fundamental problem is not agent fallibility itself—the making of factual or normative errors—but rather the exposure of affected individuals to risk levels incompatible with the sustainability of their life projects.We offer an instrumental, non-epistemic justification of a republican conception of democracy. To this end, we develop a novel consequentialist normative theory, which we term risk-centered ordinal consequentialism. This conception aims to account for defining aspects of political normativity. In this framework, the criterion of correctness—without relinquishing the pursuit of objective and impartial reasons—is the degree to which decisions approach the twin ideals of fully free and informed consensus and deregulation without interpersonal domination. In a republican democracy, the maximization of expected good—or utility—and of freedom as non-domination are extensionally equivalent.Fil: Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso". - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso".; ArgentinaCentro de Investigaciones Filosóficas2025-08-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/zipapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/291677Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul; Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy; Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Revista Latinoamericana de Fiosofía Política; 15; 1; 13-8-2025; 225-3612250-8619CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://rlfp.org.ar/revista/index.php/RLFP/article/view/172info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.36446/rlfp172info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-08-25T14:42:40Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/291677instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-08-25 14:42:40.357CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
title Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
spellingShingle Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul
Risk
Contestatory Democracy
Epistocracy
Consequentialism
title_short Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
title_full Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
title_fullStr Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
title_full_unstemmed Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
title_sort Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul
author Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul
author_facet Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Risk
Contestatory Democracy
Epistocracy
Consequentialism
topic Risk
Contestatory Democracy
Epistocracy
Consequentialism
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Why should we value democratic institutions? How does the number of individuals whose preferences are satisfied contribute to the quality of decisions made through this procedure? Should political decisions be entrusted to experts instead of allowing majorities to have decisive influence? Suppose we set aside the egalitarian values inherently present in democratic institutions and their supposed epistemic potential. We argue that increasing the satisfaction of the free and informed preferences of those affected—whether by generating the greatest possible consensus around binding decisions or by creating spaces of partial deregulation—contributes crucially to decision quality. This is because relevant political decisions are invariably made in contexts of risk. Risk acts as the non-epistemic bridge between the number of individuals supporting a decision and the quality of the expected outcome.In contexts marked by a significant probability of error and a high cost of error to individual well-being, decision-making should be conducted through an open and perpetually revisable system. This system must combine majority rule with the effective possibility of contestation at the individual or collective level, seeking to incrementally accommodate individual preferences. Rather than justifying governmental decisions solely on the grounds that they are “correct” or that decision procedures track the truth, the system’s objective should be to remain sensitive to the range of acceptable gains and tolerable losses for each affected individual. The fundamental problem is not agent fallibility itself—the making of factual or normative errors—but rather the exposure of affected individuals to risk levels incompatible with the sustainability of their life projects.We offer an instrumental, non-epistemic justification of a republican conception of democracy. To this end, we develop a novel consequentialist normative theory, which we term risk-centered ordinal consequentialism. This conception aims to account for defining aspects of political normativity. In this framework, the criterion of correctness—without relinquishing the pursuit of objective and impartial reasons—is the degree to which decisions approach the twin ideals of fully free and informed consensus and deregulation without interpersonal domination. In a republican democracy, the maximization of expected good—or utility—and of freedom as non-domination are extensionally equivalent.
Fil: Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso". - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Ciudad Universitaria. Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso".; Argentina
description Why should we value democratic institutions? How does the number of individuals whose preferences are satisfied contribute to the quality of decisions made through this procedure? Should political decisions be entrusted to experts instead of allowing majorities to have decisive influence? Suppose we set aside the egalitarian values inherently present in democratic institutions and their supposed epistemic potential. We argue that increasing the satisfaction of the free and informed preferences of those affected—whether by generating the greatest possible consensus around binding decisions or by creating spaces of partial deregulation—contributes crucially to decision quality. This is because relevant political decisions are invariably made in contexts of risk. Risk acts as the non-epistemic bridge between the number of individuals supporting a decision and the quality of the expected outcome.In contexts marked by a significant probability of error and a high cost of error to individual well-being, decision-making should be conducted through an open and perpetually revisable system. This system must combine majority rule with the effective possibility of contestation at the individual or collective level, seeking to incrementally accommodate individual preferences. Rather than justifying governmental decisions solely on the grounds that they are “correct” or that decision procedures track the truth, the system’s objective should be to remain sensitive to the range of acceptable gains and tolerable losses for each affected individual. The fundamental problem is not agent fallibility itself—the making of factual or normative errors—but rather the exposure of affected individuals to risk levels incompatible with the sustainability of their life projects.We offer an instrumental, non-epistemic justification of a republican conception of democracy. To this end, we develop a novel consequentialist normative theory, which we term risk-centered ordinal consequentialism. This conception aims to account for defining aspects of political normativity. In this framework, the criterion of correctness—without relinquishing the pursuit of objective and impartial reasons—is the degree to which decisions approach the twin ideals of fully free and informed consensus and deregulation without interpersonal domination. In a republican democracy, the maximization of expected good—or utility—and of freedom as non-domination are extensionally equivalent.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025-08-13
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/291677
Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul; Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy; Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Revista Latinoamericana de Fiosofía Política; 15; 1; 13-8-2025; 225-361
2250-8619
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/291677
identifier_str_mv Garreta Leclercq, Mariano Raul; Risk-Centered Ordinal Consequentialism: A Defense of Democracy; Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Revista Latinoamericana de Fiosofía Política; 15; 1; 13-8-2025; 225-361
2250-8619
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://rlfp.org.ar/revista/index.php/RLFP/article/view/172
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.36446/rlfp172
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/zip
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Investigaciones Filosóficas
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instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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