Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier

Autores
Blum, Daniel; Aguiar, Sebastián; Sun, Zhanli; Müller, Daniel; Álvarez, Ana; Aguirre, Inés; Domingo, Sergio; Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique
Año de publicación
2022
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Deforestation is a main threat to the biosphere due to its contribution to biodiversity loss, carbon emissions, and land degradation. Most deforestation is illegal and continues unabated, representing around half of the total deforestation in the tropics and subtropics. Quantifying illegal deforestation is challenging, let alone assessing the social and institutional processes underlying its occurrence. We tackle this challenge by quantifying the relative influence of individual (i.e., landholders’ power, landholding size) and contextual (i.e., subnational institutions, agricultural suitability) factors on the type and size of illegal deforestation in the Argentine Dry Chaco, a major commodity production frontier and global deforestation hotspot. We build a Bayesian network fed with data of 244 illegal deforestation events, obtained from journalistic articles, grey literature, key infor mant interviews, and geospatial analyses. The results reveal that more powerful landholders were associated with larger illegal deforestation events. Policy simulations suggest that higher concentration of land in the hands of powerful landholders and more flexible subnational forest regulations would escalate illegal deforestation. This points to the need for a smart policy mix that integrates across economic, agricultural, and environmental sectors to halt illegal deforestation at commodity production frontiers. A land tenure reform can facilitate forest protection, while incentives to land-use diversification and the criminal prosecution of illegal deforestation are critical to shift landholder behavior towards more balanced production and conservation outcomes.
EEA Balcarce
Fil: Blum, Daniel. Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Facultad de Agronomía. Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Sistemas de Información; Argentina
Fil: Aguiar, Sebastián. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Instituto de Investigaciones Fisiológicas y Ecológicas Vinculadas a la Agricultura; Argentina
Fil: Aguiar, Sebastián. Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Facultad de Agronomía. Departamento de Producción Vegetal; Argentina
Fil: Sun, Zhanli. Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO); Alemania
Fil: Müller, Daniel. Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO); Alemania
Fil: Müller, Daniel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Geography Department. Integrative Research Institute on Transformations of Human-Environment Systems; Alemania
Fil: Álvarez, Ana. Red Agroforestal Chaco; Argentina
Fil: Aguirre, Inés. Actividad privada; Argentina
Fil: Domingo, Sergio. Actividad privada; Argentina
Fil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). Estación Experimental Agropecuaria Balcarce. Unidad Integrada Balcarce; Argentina
Fil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata (UNMdP); Argentina
Fil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET); Argentina
Fuente
Global Environmental Change 74 : 102511. (May 2022)
Materia
Deforestación
Prácticas Ilegales
Explotación Ilegal de Madera
Análisis Cuantitativo
Corrupción
Políticas Públicas
Deforestation
Illegal Practices
Illegal Logging
Quantitative Analysis
Corruption
Public Policies
Chaco Seco, Argentina
Dry Chaco, Argentina
Subnational Institutions
Landholders
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso restringido
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Repositorio
INTA Digital (INTA)
Institución
Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria
OAI Identificador
oai:localhost:20.500.12123/26720
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oai_identifier_str oai:localhost:20.500.12123/26720
network_acronym_str INTADig
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network_name_str INTA Digital (INTA)
spelling Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontierBlum, DanielAguiar, SebastiánSun, ZhanliMüller, DanielÁlvarez, AnaAguirre, InésDomingo, SergioMastrangelo, Matías EnriqueDeforestaciónPrácticas IlegalesExplotación Ilegal de MaderaAnálisis CuantitativoCorrupciónPolíticas PúblicasDeforestationIllegal PracticesIllegal LoggingQuantitative AnalysisCorruptionPublic PoliciesChaco Seco, ArgentinaDry Chaco, ArgentinaSubnational InstitutionsLandholdersDeforestation is a main threat to the biosphere due to its contribution to biodiversity loss, carbon emissions, and land degradation. Most deforestation is illegal and continues unabated, representing around half of the total deforestation in the tropics and subtropics. Quantifying illegal deforestation is challenging, let alone assessing the social and institutional processes underlying its occurrence. We tackle this challenge by quantifying the relative influence of individual (i.e., landholders’ power, landholding size) and contextual (i.e., subnational institutions, agricultural suitability) factors on the type and size of illegal deforestation in the Argentine Dry Chaco, a major commodity production frontier and global deforestation hotspot. We build a Bayesian network fed with data of 244 illegal deforestation events, obtained from journalistic articles, grey literature, key infor mant interviews, and geospatial analyses. The results reveal that more powerful landholders were associated with larger illegal deforestation events. Policy simulations suggest that higher concentration of land in the hands of powerful landholders and more flexible subnational forest regulations would escalate illegal deforestation. This points to the need for a smart policy mix that integrates across economic, agricultural, and environmental sectors to halt illegal deforestation at commodity production frontiers. A land tenure reform can facilitate forest protection, while incentives to land-use diversification and the criminal prosecution of illegal deforestation are critical to shift landholder behavior towards more balanced production and conservation outcomes.EEA BalcarceFil: Blum, Daniel. Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Facultad de Agronomía. Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Sistemas de Información; ArgentinaFil: Aguiar, Sebastián. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Instituto de Investigaciones Fisiológicas y Ecológicas Vinculadas a la Agricultura; ArgentinaFil: Aguiar, Sebastián. Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Facultad de Agronomía. Departamento de Producción Vegetal; ArgentinaFil: Sun, Zhanli. Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO); AlemaniaFil: Müller, Daniel. Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO); AlemaniaFil: Müller, Daniel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Geography Department. Integrative Research Institute on Transformations of Human-Environment Systems; AlemaniaFil: Álvarez, Ana. Red Agroforestal Chaco; ArgentinaFil: Aguirre, Inés. Actividad privada; ArgentinaFil: Domingo, Sergio. Actividad privada; ArgentinaFil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). Estación Experimental Agropecuaria Balcarce. Unidad Integrada Balcarce; ArgentinaFil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata (UNMdP); ArgentinaFil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET); ArgentinaElsevier2026-06-19T18:36:32Z2026-06-19T18:36:32Z2022-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/26720https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S09593780220004980959-3780https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102511Global Environmental Change 74 : 102511. (May 2022)reponame:INTA Digital (INTA)instname:Instituto Nacional de Tecnología AgropecuariaengArgentina .......... (nation) (World, South America)7006477info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)2026-10-01T10:25:30Zoai:localhost:20.500.12123/26720instacron:INTAInstitucionalhttp://repositorio.inta.gob.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://repositorio.inta.gob.ar/oai/requesttripaldi.nicolas@inta.gob.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:l2026-10-01 10:25:31.093INTA Digital (INTA) - Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuariafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
title Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
spellingShingle Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
Blum, Daniel
Deforestación
Prácticas Ilegales
Explotación Ilegal de Madera
Análisis Cuantitativo
Corrupción
Políticas Públicas
Deforestation
Illegal Practices
Illegal Logging
Quantitative Analysis
Corruption
Public Policies
Chaco Seco, Argentina
Dry Chaco, Argentina
Subnational Institutions
Landholders
title_short Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
title_full Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
title_fullStr Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
title_full_unstemmed Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
title_sort Subnational institutions and power of landholders drive illegal deforestation in a major commodity production frontier
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Blum, Daniel
Aguiar, Sebastián
Sun, Zhanli
Müller, Daniel
Álvarez, Ana
Aguirre, Inés
Domingo, Sergio
Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique
author Blum, Daniel
author_facet Blum, Daniel
Aguiar, Sebastián
Sun, Zhanli
Müller, Daniel
Álvarez, Ana
Aguirre, Inés
Domingo, Sergio
Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique
author_role author
author2 Aguiar, Sebastián
Sun, Zhanli
Müller, Daniel
Álvarez, Ana
Aguirre, Inés
Domingo, Sergio
Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique
author2_role author
author
author
author
author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Deforestación
Prácticas Ilegales
Explotación Ilegal de Madera
Análisis Cuantitativo
Corrupción
Políticas Públicas
Deforestation
Illegal Practices
Illegal Logging
Quantitative Analysis
Corruption
Public Policies
Chaco Seco, Argentina
Dry Chaco, Argentina
Subnational Institutions
Landholders
topic Deforestación
Prácticas Ilegales
Explotación Ilegal de Madera
Análisis Cuantitativo
Corrupción
Políticas Públicas
Deforestation
Illegal Practices
Illegal Logging
Quantitative Analysis
Corruption
Public Policies
Chaco Seco, Argentina
Dry Chaco, Argentina
Subnational Institutions
Landholders
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Deforestation is a main threat to the biosphere due to its contribution to biodiversity loss, carbon emissions, and land degradation. Most deforestation is illegal and continues unabated, representing around half of the total deforestation in the tropics and subtropics. Quantifying illegal deforestation is challenging, let alone assessing the social and institutional processes underlying its occurrence. We tackle this challenge by quantifying the relative influence of individual (i.e., landholders’ power, landholding size) and contextual (i.e., subnational institutions, agricultural suitability) factors on the type and size of illegal deforestation in the Argentine Dry Chaco, a major commodity production frontier and global deforestation hotspot. We build a Bayesian network fed with data of 244 illegal deforestation events, obtained from journalistic articles, grey literature, key infor mant interviews, and geospatial analyses. The results reveal that more powerful landholders were associated with larger illegal deforestation events. Policy simulations suggest that higher concentration of land in the hands of powerful landholders and more flexible subnational forest regulations would escalate illegal deforestation. This points to the need for a smart policy mix that integrates across economic, agricultural, and environmental sectors to halt illegal deforestation at commodity production frontiers. A land tenure reform can facilitate forest protection, while incentives to land-use diversification and the criminal prosecution of illegal deforestation are critical to shift landholder behavior towards more balanced production and conservation outcomes.
EEA Balcarce
Fil: Blum, Daniel. Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Facultad de Agronomía. Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Sistemas de Información; Argentina
Fil: Aguiar, Sebastián. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Instituto de Investigaciones Fisiológicas y Ecológicas Vinculadas a la Agricultura; Argentina
Fil: Aguiar, Sebastián. Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA). Facultad de Agronomía. Departamento de Producción Vegetal; Argentina
Fil: Sun, Zhanli. Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO); Alemania
Fil: Müller, Daniel. Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO); Alemania
Fil: Müller, Daniel. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Geography Department. Integrative Research Institute on Transformations of Human-Environment Systems; Alemania
Fil: Álvarez, Ana. Red Agroforestal Chaco; Argentina
Fil: Aguirre, Inés. Actividad privada; Argentina
Fil: Domingo, Sergio. Actividad privada; Argentina
Fil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). Estación Experimental Agropecuaria Balcarce. Unidad Integrada Balcarce; Argentina
Fil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata (UNMdP); Argentina
Fil: Mastrangelo, Matías Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET); Argentina
description Deforestation is a main threat to the biosphere due to its contribution to biodiversity loss, carbon emissions, and land degradation. Most deforestation is illegal and continues unabated, representing around half of the total deforestation in the tropics and subtropics. Quantifying illegal deforestation is challenging, let alone assessing the social and institutional processes underlying its occurrence. We tackle this challenge by quantifying the relative influence of individual (i.e., landholders’ power, landholding size) and contextual (i.e., subnational institutions, agricultural suitability) factors on the type and size of illegal deforestation in the Argentine Dry Chaco, a major commodity production frontier and global deforestation hotspot. We build a Bayesian network fed with data of 244 illegal deforestation events, obtained from journalistic articles, grey literature, key infor mant interviews, and geospatial analyses. The results reveal that more powerful landholders were associated with larger illegal deforestation events. Policy simulations suggest that higher concentration of land in the hands of powerful landholders and more flexible subnational forest regulations would escalate illegal deforestation. This points to the need for a smart policy mix that integrates across economic, agricultural, and environmental sectors to halt illegal deforestation at commodity production frontiers. A land tenure reform can facilitate forest protection, while incentives to land-use diversification and the criminal prosecution of illegal deforestation are critical to shift landholder behavior towards more balanced production and conservation outcomes.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-05
2026-06-19T18:36:32Z
2026-06-19T18:36:32Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/26720
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378022000498
0959-3780
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102511
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/26720
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959378022000498
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102511
identifier_str_mv 0959-3780
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv restrictedAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Argentina .......... (nation) (World, South America)
7006477
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Global Environmental Change 74 : 102511. (May 2022)
reponame:INTA Digital (INTA)
instname:Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria
reponame_str INTA Digital (INTA)
collection INTA Digital (INTA)
instname_str Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria
repository.name.fl_str_mv INTA Digital (INTA) - Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria
repository.mail.fl_str_mv tripaldi.nicolas@inta.gob.ar
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