Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare

Autores
Drenik, Andrés Pablo
Año de publicación
2019
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
tesis de maestría
Estado
versión corregida
Colaborador/a o director/a de tesis
Pérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás
Descripción
Fil: Drenik, Andrés Pablo. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
We study the role of fairness concerns in the demand for redistribution through workfare. In the first part of the paper, we present new evidence from a survey experiment. We show that individuals are more generous towards poor people whom they perceive to be diligent workers relative to poor people whom they perceive to be non-diligent, a social preference that we label sympathy for the diligent. This preference is much stronger than preferences regarding other characteristics of the poor, such as race, nationality, and disability. More important, we show that subjects with higher sympathy for the diligent have a stronger preference for workfare programs. In the second part of the paper, we incorporate our empirical findings into a model of income redistribution. We consider the case of a benevolent government with fairness concerns that prioritizes the well-being of individuals who exert the most effort. We characterize the optimal conditions under which the government introduces work requirements. Even if wasteful, work requirements can be optimal, because they allow for a better distinction between individuals who exert great effort and individuals who do not. However, if the government lacks commitment power, the availability of screening through work requirements leads to a lower equilibrium effort and, possibly, a Pareto-dominated allocation.
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Repositorio
Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
Institución
Universidad de San Andrés
OAI Identificador
oai:repositorio.udesa.edu.ar:10908/17073

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spelling Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfareDrenik, Andrés PabloFil: Drenik, Andrés Pablo. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.We study the role of fairness concerns in the demand for redistribution through workfare. In the first part of the paper, we present new evidence from a survey experiment. We show that individuals are more generous towards poor people whom they perceive to be diligent workers relative to poor people whom they perceive to be non-diligent, a social preference that we label sympathy for the diligent. This preference is much stronger than preferences regarding other characteristics of the poor, such as race, nationality, and disability. More important, we show that subjects with higher sympathy for the diligent have a stronger preference for workfare programs. In the second part of the paper, we incorporate our empirical findings into a model of income redistribution. We consider the case of a benevolent government with fairness concerns that prioritizes the well-being of individuals who exert the most effort. We characterize the optimal conditions under which the government introduces work requirements. Even if wasteful, work requirements can be optimal, because they allow for a better distinction between individuals who exert great effort and individuals who do not. However, if the government lacks commitment power, the availability of screening through work requirements leads to a lower equilibrium effort and, possibly, a Pareto-dominated allocation.Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de EconomíaPérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás2020-03-09T17:51:39Z2020-03-09T17:51:39Z2019-07Tesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdccinfo:ar-repo/semantics/tesisDeMaestriaapplication/pdfapplication/pdfDrenik, A. P. (2019). Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/reponame:Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)instname:Universidad de San Andrés2026-10-23T11:50:43Zoai:repositorio.udesa.edu.ar:10908/17073instacron:Universidad de San AndrésInstitucionalhttp://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/jspui/Universidad privadaNo correspondehttp://repositorio.udesa.edu.ar/oai/requestmsanroman@udesa.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:23632026-10-23 11:50:47.271Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa) - Universidad de San Andrésfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
spellingShingle Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
Drenik, Andrés Pablo
title_short Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_full Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_fullStr Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_full_unstemmed Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
title_sort Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Drenik, Andrés Pablo
author Drenik, Andrés Pablo
author_facet Drenik, Andrés Pablo
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Pérez Truglia, Ricardo Nicolás
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Fil: Drenik, Andrés Pablo. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
We study the role of fairness concerns in the demand for redistribution through workfare. In the first part of the paper, we present new evidence from a survey experiment. We show that individuals are more generous towards poor people whom they perceive to be diligent workers relative to poor people whom they perceive to be non-diligent, a social preference that we label sympathy for the diligent. This preference is much stronger than preferences regarding other characteristics of the poor, such as race, nationality, and disability. More important, we show that subjects with higher sympathy for the diligent have a stronger preference for workfare programs. In the second part of the paper, we incorporate our empirical findings into a model of income redistribution. We consider the case of a benevolent government with fairness concerns that prioritizes the well-being of individuals who exert the most effort. We characterize the optimal conditions under which the government introduces work requirements. Even if wasteful, work requirements can be optimal, because they allow for a better distinction between individuals who exert great effort and individuals who do not. However, if the government lacks commitment power, the availability of screening through work requirements leads to a lower equilibrium effort and, possibly, a Pareto-dominated allocation.
description Fil: Drenik, Andrés Pablo. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
publishDate 2019
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019-07
2020-03-09T17:51:39Z
2020-03-09T17:51:39Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Tesis
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
info:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_bdcc
info:ar-repo/semantics/tesisDeMaestria
format masterThesis
status_str updatedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv Drenik, A. P. (2019). Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073
http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073
identifier_str_mv Drenik, A. P. (2019). Sympathy for the diligent and the demand for workfare. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073
url http://hdl.handle.net/10908/17073
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
instname:Universidad de San Andrés
reponame_str Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
collection Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa)
instname_str Universidad de San Andrés
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Digital San Andrés (UdeSa) - Universidad de San Andrés
repository.mail.fl_str_mv msanroman@udesa.edu.ar
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