No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field

Autores
Gaido, Paula Marina
Año de publicación
2025
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
parte de libro
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The analysis that I undertake in this chapter is primarily intended to highlight a persistent problem. It is still not yet clear what justificatory reasons judges and ordinary addressees are required to provide for their decisions and actions in the legal field. In formulating my argument, I draw upon two theories of law that argue that to understand law it is necessary to give an account of its practical relevance, which is not possible without showing the moral value that it realises. However, both approaches concur that any conclusive justification presupposes a normative choice that goes beyond what is prescribed by law. These are the theories of law developed by Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron. In this chapter I want to assess the extent to which their insights regarding the practical relevance of law remain compelling once we take into account the nuances each one incorporates into their respective accounts of law.Both theories share some common metatheoretical commitments that allow us to read them as engaged in the same theoretical enterprise and as having meaningful disagreements. To begin with, they seek to give an account of our concept of law. Raz explicitly states that the purpose of his theory is to articulate our concept of law, ie, the one configured by modern Western society. Waldron mostly pursues giving an account of democratic law. However, as modern Western societies are typically committed to democracy, for the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that there is no significant difference between them regarding their theoretical enterprise. They concur that our concept of law presupposes the unity thesis. This is the thesis that there is an ordered system of reasons of different kinds, including aesthetic, religious, moral and so forth, and that, in case of conflict, it is always the same kind of reason that prevails: the moral one. They agree that legal reasons are a type of moral reasons. The significant divergence between them appears to be the way they conceive the moral value that grounds law. I will argue that this divergence does not prevent them agreeing that the possibility of conclusively justifying in the legal field exclusively on legal (moral) reasons is not available, not only to judges, but also to addressees who want to retain rationality. It is now interesting to note how both theoretical approaches coincide in that law, as constituting a particular type of moral reasons does not provide in any case the ultimate criterion by which to judge particulars, as a constitutive element in the way in which we (as rational human beings) are committed to think about law.
Fil: Gaido, Paula Marina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Estudios sobre Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Estudios sobre Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad; Argentina
Materia
PRACTICAL REASONING
LEGAL REASONING
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
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oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/291199
Acceder
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spelling No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal FieldGaido, Paula MarinaPRACTICAL REASONINGLEGAL REASONINGLEGAL JUSTIFICATIONLEGAL ARGUMENTATIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5The analysis that I undertake in this chapter is primarily intended to highlight a persistent problem. It is still not yet clear what justificatory reasons judges and ordinary addressees are required to provide for their decisions and actions in the legal field. In formulating my argument, I draw upon two theories of law that argue that to understand law it is necessary to give an account of its practical relevance, which is not possible without showing the moral value that it realises. However, both approaches concur that any conclusive justification presupposes a normative choice that goes beyond what is prescribed by law. These are the theories of law developed by Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron. In this chapter I want to assess the extent to which their insights regarding the practical relevance of law remain compelling once we take into account the nuances each one incorporates into their respective accounts of law.Both theories share some common metatheoretical commitments that allow us to read them as engaged in the same theoretical enterprise and as having meaningful disagreements. To begin with, they seek to give an account of our concept of law. Raz explicitly states that the purpose of his theory is to articulate our concept of law, ie, the one configured by modern Western society. Waldron mostly pursues giving an account of democratic law. However, as modern Western societies are typically committed to democracy, for the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that there is no significant difference between them regarding their theoretical enterprise. They concur that our concept of law presupposes the unity thesis. This is the thesis that there is an ordered system of reasons of different kinds, including aesthetic, religious, moral and so forth, and that, in case of conflict, it is always the same kind of reason that prevails: the moral one. They agree that legal reasons are a type of moral reasons. The significant divergence between them appears to be the way they conceive the moral value that grounds law. I will argue that this divergence does not prevent them agreeing that the possibility of conclusively justifying in the legal field exclusively on legal (moral) reasons is not available, not only to judges, but also to addressees who want to retain rationality. It is now interesting to note how both theoretical approaches coincide in that law, as constituting a particular type of moral reasons does not provide in any case the ultimate criterion by which to judge particulars, as a constitutive element in the way in which we (as rational human beings) are committed to think about law.Fil: Gaido, Paula Marina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Estudios sobre Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Estudios sobre Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad; ArgentinaBloomsbury PublishingDei Vecchi, DiegoFigueroa Rubio, SebastiánRapetti, PabloRedondo, Maria Cristina2025info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookParthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248info:ar-repo/semantics/parteDeLibroapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/291199Gaido, Paula Marina; No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field; Bloomsbury Publishing; 2025; 173-184978-1-50998-157-1CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/monograph-detail?docid=b-9781509981540&pdfid=9781509981540.ch-009.pdf&tocid=b-9781509981540-chapter9info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-08-25T15:50:20Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/291199instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-08-25 15:50:21.275CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
title No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
spellingShingle No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
Gaido, Paula Marina
PRACTICAL REASONING
LEGAL REASONING
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION
title_short No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
title_full No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
title_fullStr No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
title_full_unstemmed No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
title_sort No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Gaido, Paula Marina
author Gaido, Paula Marina
author_facet Gaido, Paula Marina
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Dei Vecchi, Diego
Figueroa Rubio, Sebastián
Rapetti, Pablo
Redondo, Maria Cristina
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv PRACTICAL REASONING
LEGAL REASONING
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION
topic PRACTICAL REASONING
LEGAL REASONING
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
LEGAL ARGUMENTATION
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The analysis that I undertake in this chapter is primarily intended to highlight a persistent problem. It is still not yet clear what justificatory reasons judges and ordinary addressees are required to provide for their decisions and actions in the legal field. In formulating my argument, I draw upon two theories of law that argue that to understand law it is necessary to give an account of its practical relevance, which is not possible without showing the moral value that it realises. However, both approaches concur that any conclusive justification presupposes a normative choice that goes beyond what is prescribed by law. These are the theories of law developed by Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron. In this chapter I want to assess the extent to which their insights regarding the practical relevance of law remain compelling once we take into account the nuances each one incorporates into their respective accounts of law.Both theories share some common metatheoretical commitments that allow us to read them as engaged in the same theoretical enterprise and as having meaningful disagreements. To begin with, they seek to give an account of our concept of law. Raz explicitly states that the purpose of his theory is to articulate our concept of law, ie, the one configured by modern Western society. Waldron mostly pursues giving an account of democratic law. However, as modern Western societies are typically committed to democracy, for the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that there is no significant difference between them regarding their theoretical enterprise. They concur that our concept of law presupposes the unity thesis. This is the thesis that there is an ordered system of reasons of different kinds, including aesthetic, religious, moral and so forth, and that, in case of conflict, it is always the same kind of reason that prevails: the moral one. They agree that legal reasons are a type of moral reasons. The significant divergence between them appears to be the way they conceive the moral value that grounds law. I will argue that this divergence does not prevent them agreeing that the possibility of conclusively justifying in the legal field exclusively on legal (moral) reasons is not available, not only to judges, but also to addressees who want to retain rationality. It is now interesting to note how both theoretical approaches coincide in that law, as constituting a particular type of moral reasons does not provide in any case the ultimate criterion by which to judge particulars, as a constitutive element in the way in which we (as rational human beings) are committed to think about law.
Fil: Gaido, Paula Marina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Estudios sobre Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Estudios sobre Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad; Argentina
description The analysis that I undertake in this chapter is primarily intended to highlight a persistent problem. It is still not yet clear what justificatory reasons judges and ordinary addressees are required to provide for their decisions and actions in the legal field. In formulating my argument, I draw upon two theories of law that argue that to understand law it is necessary to give an account of its practical relevance, which is not possible without showing the moral value that it realises. However, both approaches concur that any conclusive justification presupposes a normative choice that goes beyond what is prescribed by law. These are the theories of law developed by Joseph Raz and Jeremy Waldron. In this chapter I want to assess the extent to which their insights regarding the practical relevance of law remain compelling once we take into account the nuances each one incorporates into their respective accounts of law.Both theories share some common metatheoretical commitments that allow us to read them as engaged in the same theoretical enterprise and as having meaningful disagreements. To begin with, they seek to give an account of our concept of law. Raz explicitly states that the purpose of his theory is to articulate our concept of law, ie, the one configured by modern Western society. Waldron mostly pursues giving an account of democratic law. However, as modern Western societies are typically committed to democracy, for the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that there is no significant difference between them regarding their theoretical enterprise. They concur that our concept of law presupposes the unity thesis. This is the thesis that there is an ordered system of reasons of different kinds, including aesthetic, religious, moral and so forth, and that, in case of conflict, it is always the same kind of reason that prevails: the moral one. They agree that legal reasons are a type of moral reasons. The significant divergence between them appears to be the way they conceive the moral value that grounds law. I will argue that this divergence does not prevent them agreeing that the possibility of conclusively justifying in the legal field exclusively on legal (moral) reasons is not available, not only to judges, but also to addressees who want to retain rationality. It is now interesting to note how both theoretical approaches coincide in that law, as constituting a particular type of moral reasons does not provide in any case the ultimate criterion by which to judge particulars, as a constitutive element in the way in which we (as rational human beings) are committed to think about law.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248
info:ar-repo/semantics/parteDeLibro
status_str publishedVersion
format bookPart
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/291199
Gaido, Paula Marina; No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field; Bloomsbury Publishing; 2025; 173-184
978-1-50998-157-1
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/291199
identifier_str_mv Gaido, Paula Marina; No Place for Law as an Ultimate Justificatory Reason: Revisiting Raz’s and Waldron’s Accounts on Justification in the Legal Field; Bloomsbury Publishing; 2025; 173-184
978-1-50998-157-1
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/monograph-detail?docid=b-9781509981540&pdfid=9781509981540.ch-009.pdf&tocid=b-9781509981540-chapter9
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Bloomsbury Publishing
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Bloomsbury Publishing
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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