The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds

Autores
Redondo, Maria Cristina
Año de publicación
2025
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
parte de libro
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This chapter critically assesses the prevailing position in legal theory, which analyses legal norms as a kind of reason for action from the perspective of moral philosophy. The assessment focuses on how the dominant positions in this debate explain reasons for action in general, as well as the specific capacity of law to constitute reasons for action. The background to the prevailing conception is based, among other things, on a unitary conception of practical reasoning that locates the fundamental source of justificatory power in morality. In doing so, it also assumes a particular conception of morality. In the first part of this contribution, I use Bernard Williams's perspective to critique both the peculiar conception of morality held by the current position and its conception of reasons and rational justification. Building on this, I aim to advance a critique of the equation between what is justified and what one ought to do morally. Following these reflections on morality and rational justification, the second part of the chapter returns to the debate about the conditions under which law can justify decisions. In this regard, I emphasise in what sense the law's connection with morality can be relevant to justifying actions, and in what sense it is completely irrelevant. In light of Williams's thoughts on morality and reasons, I demonstrate that law can provide a distinct set of reasons that are not necessarily subordinate to morality. More specifically, with reference to cases of conflict between legal reasons, I highlight that it is also possible to reject the widely accepted idea that one must always act for an undefeated reason. In this regard, I argue that an appropriate account of reasons enables one to assert that, just as in the moral sphere, within the legal sphere, in cases of conflict between reasons, one can be justified in doing something that is required by defeated reasons.
Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina
Materia
UNITY OF PRACTICAL REASONING
FRAGMENTATION OF PRACTICAL REASONING
LAW
LEGAL NORMATIVITY
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/291173
Acceder
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spelling The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral GroundsRedondo, Maria CristinaUNITY OF PRACTICAL REASONINGFRAGMENTATION OF PRACTICAL REASONINGLAWLEGAL NORMATIVITYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This chapter critically assesses the prevailing position in legal theory, which analyses legal norms as a kind of reason for action from the perspective of moral philosophy. The assessment focuses on how the dominant positions in this debate explain reasons for action in general, as well as the specific capacity of law to constitute reasons for action. The background to the prevailing conception is based, among other things, on a unitary conception of practical reasoning that locates the fundamental source of justificatory power in morality. In doing so, it also assumes a particular conception of morality. In the first part of this contribution, I use Bernard Williams's perspective to critique both the peculiar conception of morality held by the current position and its conception of reasons and rational justification. Building on this, I aim to advance a critique of the equation between what is justified and what one ought to do morally. Following these reflections on morality and rational justification, the second part of the chapter returns to the debate about the conditions under which law can justify decisions. In this regard, I emphasise in what sense the law's connection with morality can be relevant to justifying actions, and in what sense it is completely irrelevant. In light of Williams's thoughts on morality and reasons, I demonstrate that law can provide a distinct set of reasons that are not necessarily subordinate to morality. More specifically, with reference to cases of conflict between legal reasons, I highlight that it is also possible to reject the widely accepted idea that one must always act for an undefeated reason. In this regard, I argue that an appropriate account of reasons enables one to assert that, just as in the moral sphere, within the legal sphere, in cases of conflict between reasons, one can be justified in doing something that is required by defeated reasons.Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; ArgentinaBloomsburyDei Vecchi, DiegoFigueroa Rubio, SebastiánRapetti, PabloRedondo, Maria Cristina2025info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookParthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248info:ar-repo/semantics/parteDeLibroapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/291173Redondo, Maria Cristina; The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds; Bloomsbury; 2025; 77-98978-1-50998-157-1CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/monograph-detail?docid=b-9781509981540&pdfid=9781509981540.ch-004.pdf&tocid=b-9781509981540-chapter4info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-08-25T15:12:38Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/291173instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-08-25 15:12:38.481CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
title The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
spellingShingle The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
Redondo, Maria Cristina
UNITY OF PRACTICAL REASONING
FRAGMENTATION OF PRACTICAL REASONING
LAW
LEGAL NORMATIVITY
title_short The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
title_full The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
title_fullStr The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
title_full_unstemmed The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
title_sort The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Redondo, Maria Cristina
author Redondo, Maria Cristina
author_facet Redondo, Maria Cristina
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Dei Vecchi, Diego
Figueroa Rubio, Sebastián
Rapetti, Pablo
Redondo, Maria Cristina
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv UNITY OF PRACTICAL REASONING
FRAGMENTATION OF PRACTICAL REASONING
LAW
LEGAL NORMATIVITY
topic UNITY OF PRACTICAL REASONING
FRAGMENTATION OF PRACTICAL REASONING
LAW
LEGAL NORMATIVITY
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This chapter critically assesses the prevailing position in legal theory, which analyses legal norms as a kind of reason for action from the perspective of moral philosophy. The assessment focuses on how the dominant positions in this debate explain reasons for action in general, as well as the specific capacity of law to constitute reasons for action. The background to the prevailing conception is based, among other things, on a unitary conception of practical reasoning that locates the fundamental source of justificatory power in morality. In doing so, it also assumes a particular conception of morality. In the first part of this contribution, I use Bernard Williams's perspective to critique both the peculiar conception of morality held by the current position and its conception of reasons and rational justification. Building on this, I aim to advance a critique of the equation between what is justified and what one ought to do morally. Following these reflections on morality and rational justification, the second part of the chapter returns to the debate about the conditions under which law can justify decisions. In this regard, I emphasise in what sense the law's connection with morality can be relevant to justifying actions, and in what sense it is completely irrelevant. In light of Williams's thoughts on morality and reasons, I demonstrate that law can provide a distinct set of reasons that are not necessarily subordinate to morality. More specifically, with reference to cases of conflict between legal reasons, I highlight that it is also possible to reject the widely accepted idea that one must always act for an undefeated reason. In this regard, I argue that an appropriate account of reasons enables one to assert that, just as in the moral sphere, within the legal sphere, in cases of conflict between reasons, one can be justified in doing something that is required by defeated reasons.
Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentina
description This chapter critically assesses the prevailing position in legal theory, which analyses legal norms as a kind of reason for action from the perspective of moral philosophy. The assessment focuses on how the dominant positions in this debate explain reasons for action in general, as well as the specific capacity of law to constitute reasons for action. The background to the prevailing conception is based, among other things, on a unitary conception of practical reasoning that locates the fundamental source of justificatory power in morality. In doing so, it also assumes a particular conception of morality. In the first part of this contribution, I use Bernard Williams's perspective to critique both the peculiar conception of morality held by the current position and its conception of reasons and rational justification. Building on this, I aim to advance a critique of the equation between what is justified and what one ought to do morally. Following these reflections on morality and rational justification, the second part of the chapter returns to the debate about the conditions under which law can justify decisions. In this regard, I emphasise in what sense the law's connection with morality can be relevant to justifying actions, and in what sense it is completely irrelevant. In light of Williams's thoughts on morality and reasons, I demonstrate that law can provide a distinct set of reasons that are not necessarily subordinate to morality. More specifically, with reference to cases of conflict between legal reasons, I highlight that it is also possible to reject the widely accepted idea that one must always act for an undefeated reason. In this regard, I argue that an appropriate account of reasons enables one to assert that, just as in the moral sphere, within the legal sphere, in cases of conflict between reasons, one can be justified in doing something that is required by defeated reasons.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/bookPart
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248
info:ar-repo/semantics/parteDeLibro
status_str publishedVersion
format bookPart
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/291173
Redondo, Maria Cristina; The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds; Bloomsbury; 2025; 77-98
978-1-50998-157-1
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/291173
identifier_str_mv Redondo, Maria Cristina; The Dogma of the Unity of Practical Reasoning on Moral Grounds; Bloomsbury; 2025; 77-98
978-1-50998-157-1
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/monograph-detail?docid=b-9781509981540&pdfid=9781509981540.ch-004.pdf&tocid=b-9781509981540-chapter4
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Bloomsbury
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Bloomsbury
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.265058

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